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WHISTLING WHILE YOU WORK: EXPANDING
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS TO INCLUDE NON-
WORKPLACE-RELATED RETALIATION AFTER
BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE
I. INTRODUCTION
Whistleblowers play an important role in revealing illegal, un-
ethical, and dangerous conditions or activities. They uncover
wrongdoing on a massive scale. Because the behavior they report
is, by its very nature, dangerous to the public, society has an obli-
gation to protect and encourage whistleblowers who call attention
to illegal and harmful activity. Unfortunately though, existing
laws leave gaps that expose whistleblowers to effective types of
retaliation.1 These gaps leave potential whistleblowers wondering
what their fate will be if they report dangerous, harmful, or ille-
gal activity. They allow employers to use non-workplace-related
retaliation to silence whistleblowers as most existing laws only
cover workplace-related retaliation.2 Lawmakers need to fill this
void so that legitimate whistleblowers will be encouraged to re-
veal dangerous behavior that harms the public.
Current laws only protect whistleblowers against retaliation if
their employer takes an adverse employment action against
them. Whistleblower statutes and implementing regulations ex-
plicitly state this requirement.3 This requirement presents a
problem because it excludes retaliation claims in which the re-
taliatory act does not affect the whistleblower's terms or condi-
tions of employment. For example, existing laws generally leave
1. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURE IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 79-
80 (2001).
2. See infra Part III.B.2.
3. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (2000).
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uncovered retaliation occurring outside of work, and retaliation
occurring after the whistleblower is fired or has quit.4
Even though whistleblower statutes only cover workplace-
related retaliation, provisions in non-whistleblower laws such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 now protect against out-
of-work retaliation.5 Before 2006, most United States courts of
appeal required a Title VII plaintiff to prove an adverse employ-
ment action to recover for retaliation.6 In Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, however, the Supreme Court
eliminated that requirement, holding that Title VII also protects
against non-workplace-related retaliation.7 The Court cited sig-
nificant public policy reasons for doing so.' It also largely justified
its holding based on Title VII's language,9 which, unlike whistle-
blower laws, does not specifically require retaliation to affect the
terms or conditions of employment.1 o
This landmark ruling now presents a fundamental inconsis-
tency between whistleblower retaliation laws and non-whistle-
blower retaliation laws, such as Title VII. Further, this discrep-
ancy presents an interesting issue because whistleblower retalia-
tion case law generally adheres to Title VII precedent.' This ad-
4. See infra Part III.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). Other non-whistleblower, employment-related
retaliation statutes follow Title VII's scheme. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)
(2000). Title VII is the most followed example and will provide the context for this com-
ment.
6. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
7. 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412-14 (2006).
8. Id. at 2412-13.
9. Id. at 2411-12.
10. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment
agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to dis-
criminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
11. See, e.g., Hirst v. Se. Airlines, Inc., 25 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cases (BNA) 1276, 1281
(Dep't of Labor 2007); see also DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLE-
BLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 8 (2d ed. Supp. 2006) (stating that many
courts rely on the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence to interpret other whistle-
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herence to Title VII case law has left commentators wondering
how Burlington Northern will affect whistleblower litigation
given that the specific workplace-related requirement in whistle-
blower statutes is no longer required for Title VII retaliation
cases. 12
This comment will not attempt to harmonize the different
standards or predict a future course of interpretation. Instead, it
will address the existing disparity as an opportunity to amend
whistleblower laws to provide meaningful protection against all
types of retaliation, not just those that affect the whistleblower's
terms or conditions of employment. With this broad goal as a ba-
sis, this comment will specifically advocate amending all federal
whistleblower statutes' retaliation provisions to conform to Title
VII's retaliation provision. This would eliminate the requirement
that the retaliation affect the terms or conditions of employment
and incorporate the public policy rationale outlined in Burlington
Northern.
Part II of this comment will discuss the importance of whistle-
blowers, and Part III will review current whistleblower statutes.
Part IV will provide a brief background of pre-Burlington North-
ern Title VII retaliation claims. Part V will discuss Burlington
Northern's holding as the new standard in Title VII cases. Part VI
will argue for reforming whistleblower laws to conform to Title
VII and to incorporate Burlington Northern's holding and ration-
ale.
II. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF WHISTLEBLOWING
Black's Law Dictionary defines a whistleblower as "[a]n em-
ployee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or
law-enforcement agency."' 3 The name comes from the figurative
action-"blowing the whistle"-involved in exposing unlawful ac-
tivity. 14 Whistleblowers have been described as "ordinary hero [es]
blower laws).
12. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 66-67 (discussing the potential ef-
fects of Burlington Northern in how Sarbanes-Oxley is interpreted and applied).
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 2004).
14. "The term is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle upon
becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other law enforcement officers and
the public within the zone of danger." Winter v. Houston Chron. Publ'g Co., 795 S.E.2d
723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring).
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who help[ I America function when it wants to slip into self-
interest and faction."1" They expose dangerous, illegal, and harm-
ful activities of both governments and private organizations from
the inside by providing information to supervisors, regulating au-
thorities, or governmental bodies.16
Whistleblowers also play an extremely important role in un-
covering and correcting governmental waste, environmental dan-
gers, public safety violations, conspiracies, fraud, and deceit. Re-
cent events have highlighted the importance of insiders exposing
illegal or harmful activity. The trio of whistleblowers selected as
Time magazine's Persons of the Year in 2002 perhaps best repre-
sents the important role whistleblowers have played in recent
years.17 Time selected three women who played roles in uncover-
ing arguably the most massive scandals in recent history.
Two-Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper-worked at Enron
and WorldCom, respectively. Both revealed their companies' mas-
sive accounting irregularities before they became public.' These
financial scandals not only caused the two companies to implode,
but also brought down one of the "Big Five" accounting firms, Ar-
thur Andersen.19 At the time, Enron's bankruptcy was the largest
ever.2 ° It was eclipsed only seven months later when WorldCom
filed the largest bankruptcy claim in American history.21 These
scandals cost thousands of employees their jobs.22 Many of them
had their retirement accounts invested in company stock, which
became essentially worthless.23 According to one calculation,
WorldCom stockholders lost $179.3 billion when the company's
15. Scott Bloch, Commentary, America Will Always Need Whistleblowers, FED. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2007, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2510890.
16. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 154-55 (2007).
17. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at
30.
18. See id.
19. See KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY 666-67 (2005) (dis-
cussing the repercussions and criminal consequences for Arthur Andersen as a result of
Enron's and others' accounting scandals).
20. In S.F., Enron's "E" Stands for Embarrassing, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2002, at 3,
available at 2002 WLNR 12464856.
21. Id.
22. See Daniel Kadlec, WorldCon, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 20.
23. See id. (noting that WorldCom stock, which peaked at $64.50 per share in 1999,
fell to $0.83 following the scandal and noting a similar, albeit less severe, result for Enron
shares).
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fraudulent accounting practices were discovered. 24 Not only did
stockholders lose their money, but American investors also lost
confidence in the country's securities markets as well.25 Vowing
to combat corporate fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act as a result of these crises. 26 Besides reforming corporate ac-
countability, it also included whistleblower protections for em-
ployees who expose fraud.27
Time named Coleen Rowley as its third Person of the Year af-
ter she exposed lapses in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
("FBI") handling of terrorist suspect Zacarias Moussaoui before
September 11, 2001.2" Rowley, an FBI attorney, wrote Director
Robert Mueller and later testified before Congress, claiming that
the FBI brushed off and obstructed repeated pleas by her Minne-
sota field office to investigate Moussaoui before the World Trade
Center attacks. 29 Revealing these systemic structural inefficien-
cies in the FBI's intelligence collection procedures led to the for-
mation of the FBI's Office of Intelligence, which now focuses on
intelligence analysis and information sharing.3 °
These recent high-profile scandals have attracted attention to
the important role whistleblowers play in high-stakes activities
and corporate boardrooms. Whistleblowers also reveal less glam-
orous, yet just as dangerous, activity nationwide. The U.S. Office
of Special Counsel ("OSC"), which is charged with enforcing whis-
tleblower laws covering federal employees, awarded Leroy Smith
its Public Servant of the Year Award in 2006 after Smith reported
dangerously high amounts of heavy metals in a Bureau of Prisons
24. See LYNNE W. JETER, DISCONNECTED: DECEIT AND BETRAYAL AT WORLDCOM 204,
237 (2003). "The loss in total market value was calculated from the peak stock price-
$64.50 on June 21, 1999-to the date of the bankruptcy filing." Id. at 237.
25. See Kadlec, supra note 22.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). See generally Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (discussing the factors leading to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2000).
28. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 17, at 30.
29. See Amanda Ripley & Maggie Sieger, The Special Agent, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at
34; see also Letter from Coleen M. Rowley, Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Div.
Counsel, to Robert Mueller, FBI Dir. (May 21, 2002), http://www.time.com/time/printout/
0,8816,24997,00.html.
30. See Press Release, FBI, FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission
(Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/04/fbi04 0303.html.
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computer disassembly plant.3' In 2005, the OSC gave the award
to Anne Whiteman.3 2 Whiteman worked as an air traffic control-
ler at the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport.33 She revealed
that other controllers and managers routinely covered up inci-
dents in which aircraft flew dangerously close to each other.34
Whistleblowers bring about reform and accountability, often by
exposing illegal activity. Because offenders face jail time and civil
fines once their actions are exposed by whistleblowers, it is no
wonder that many employers want to silence these bearers of bad
news.35 Therefore, the targets of whistleblowers frequently retali-
ate to silence, harass, or discredit them.36
Despite existing protections, most whistleblowers inevitably
face retaliation, harassment, or intimidation. WorldCom whistle-
blower Cynthia Cooper recognized this fact and cautioned:
Any time you step over that invisible line and become a
whistleblower, you will receive some criticism. You have to know
who you are at your core and accept the inevitable criticism. You
must understand that there is clearly a cost associated with any
actions you may take. For many, that cost may be severe.
3 7
Cooper is not alone. Whistleblowers face serious repercussions
in almost all instances. A recent study of whistleblowers found
that "[t]he most common fallout from their whistle-blowing in-
volved: (a) severe depression or anxiety (84%), (b) feelings of iso-
lation or powerlessness (84%), (c) distrust of others (78%), (d) de-
31. See Press Release, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, OSC Names Recipient of 2006
Public Servant Award (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/press/
2006/pr06_16.htm.
32. Press Release, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, FAA Whistleblower Anne Whiteman
Receives 2005 Special Counsel's Public Servant Award (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http:l!
www.osc.gov/documents/press/2005/prO5_18.htm.
33. Id.
34. See Press Release, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Office of Special Counsel
Transmits Report of Cover-up of Operational Errors by FAA Personnel at Dallas Fort
Worth Airport (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/press/2005/pr0
5_15.htm.
35. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 16, at 148.
36. See Mariam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1029, 1051-52 (2004).
37. Michael Barrier, One Right Path: Cynthia Cooper: MCI Vice President of Internal
Audit Cynthia Cooper Believes that Where Ethics Are Concerned, You Have to Obey Your
Conscience and Accept the Consequences-Interview, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2003,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4153/is_6_60/ai_111737943.
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clining physical health (69%), (e) severe financial decline (66%),
and () problems with family relations (53%). "3 The same study
reported that roughly two-thirds of internal whistleblowers lost
their jobs and were later blacklisted in their occupations.39 These
statistics are not surprising. Examples of retaliation against
whistleblowers are far too common to discuss in depth.4 °
To feel comfortable exposing fraud and public danger, potential
whistleblowers need to know that they will be protected if they
make disclosures. This protection can only come from laws that
effectively prevent all retaliation and encourage and fully protect
whistleblowers who voluntarily disclose wrongdoing.
38. Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Manage-
ment Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26
WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 107, 121 (1999).
39. See id. at 120.
40. For a particularly lengthy account of one whistleblower's experience, see generally
PETER ROST, THE WHISTLEBLOWER: CONFESSIONS OF A HEALTHCARE HITMAN (2006), which
documents Dr. Rost's fall from Vice President of a major pharmaceutical company to un-
employment, including the many forms of retaliation that he endured in the process.
Other stories chronicle Transportation Security Administration employees who alleged
that they were retaliated against after bringing to light serious screening errors and
lapses in airport security. See Ron Marsico, Whistleblowers Hit Turbulence: TSA Ex-
Employees Say They've Been Blackballed for Revealing Problems, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Oct. 14, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 20200165. Government employees have
further alleged that the Office of Special Counsel, tasked with protecting federal whistle-
blowers, retaliated against its own employees by relocating them to distant field offices
when they opposed the Special Counsel's policies. See infra note 46. One chilling account
details a former payday lender employee's pushback when he tried to testify about the
lender's illegal and predatory practices. See Chris Flores, Whistle-Blowers Suing Payday
Lender, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), Oct. 26, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR
21151387. The lender's lobbyist allegedly told police that the employee was wanted for a
sexual offense. Id. Police arrested him while he was waiting in the hall after testifying to
the Washington, D.C. city council about his former employer's illegal practices. Id. After
being released, he sent an e-mail to the entire Virginia General Assembly outlining the
lender's practices. Id. He received a return e-mail soliciting his information from a "dele-
gate," who turned out to be an investigator in Texas. Id. The man later found spyware
programs on his computer and alleged that he received anonymous phone calls threaten-
ing him. Id. Stories such as these abound, and one need not look further than the daily
newspaper to find similar accounts at all levels of the public and private sectors.
20081 1343
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III. CURRENT WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES AND
THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
A. Shortcomings of Existing Whistleblower Laws and the Need for
Reform
Whistleblower laws exist to protect and encourage those who
report public safety violations, health and environmental con-
cerns, corporate fraud, and numerous other harmful activities
that may otherwise go unnoticed." As stated by Congress with
respect to current legislation, the laws attempt to "ensure that
employees can report their concerns without the fear of possible
retaliation."42 The Supreme Court has noted that retaliation pro-
visions exist to "ensure that employees are 'completely free from
coercion against reporting' unlawful practices."43 This purpose,
however, has largely gone unfulfilled.
Existing whistleblower laws are under steady attack from ex-
perts in the field. Various authors have criticized whistleblower
laws-and their implementation-based on many factors. Com-
mon criticisms come from the laws' rigid procedural rules, misap-
plication of the whistleblower's burden of proof by judges, and un-
clear standards regarding which employees, employers, and
protected activities are covered by the laws.44 One recent study of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provision highlighted
these issues. It reported that when a full administrative hearing
is held and an administrative law judge ("ALJ") makes a deter-
mination for either the employee or employer, the employee win
rate is a meager 6.5%.
Another common criticism is a lack of proper enforcement by
the governmental agencies responsible for investigating whistle-
41. Matthew R. Hall, Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks,
Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 645 n.19 (1996).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 110-259, at 348 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
43. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006) (quoting
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972)).
44. See Moberly, supra note 16; see also John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Note,
Whistler's Nocturne in Black and Gold-The Falling Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblower Provision Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 235, 251-
54 (2005).
45. Moberly, supra note 16, at 91.
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blower claims. Many have leveled attacks against the OSC. 46 The
OSC's 2006 Annual Report also paints a bleak picture. It reported
the results of a survey of employees who made prohibited person-
nel practices claims to the OSC. 41 Of the 256 people responding,
just ten were satisfied with the result the OSC obtained for
them.4" Only one was very satisfied. 49 This contrasts with twenty-
eight dissatisfied respondents.5 ° Strikingly, 209, or more than
eighty-one percent, of respondents were very dissatisfied with the
OSC's results.51
Lawmakers have also offered criticisms of the status quo.
Senator Chuck Grassley, widely known for supporting whistle-
blowers, recently noted on the Senate floor that "our work in this
field is unfinished and more can be done."52 He excoriated federal
agencies that "prevent the truth from coming out" and that
"shoot[ I] the whistleblower instead of addressing the problem."53
There are many reasons to criticize the existing statutory
framework and enforcement of whistleblower laws. Although this
comment will not specifically address the other noted deficiencies
in the current state of whistleblower law, it will add to the ever-
growing call for reform in this muddled and often unsupportive
field. Many authors have proposed comprehensive whistleblower
legislation,54 but actual legislative reform does not seem to be
gaining much traction. Although a comprehensive law would be
ideal, current and future laws should nonetheless strive to pro-
vide as much protection as possible for whistleblowers.
46. Many critics have accused the OSC of retaliating against its own employees and
improperly purging backlogged cases. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson, Special Counsel Ac-
cused of Intimidation in Probe; Contact with Investigators Controlled, Employees Say
WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2007, at A21. Further, the OSC allegedly cancelled Leroy Smith's
2006 Public Servant of the Year acceptance speech when it was informed that Smith was
going to criticize the OSC for non-responsiveness in a subsequent address. See Elizabeth
Williamson, Special Counsel Cancels Award Ceremony for Whistle-Blower, WASH. POST,
Sept. 11, 2006, at A15.
47. U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO CONGRESS app. at 47-51 (2006),
available at http://www.osc.gov/documents/reports/ar-2006.pdf.




52. 153 Cong. Rec. S6034 (daily ed. May 14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 1, at 391-94.
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B. Overview of Existing Federal Legislation
Because Congress has not passed comprehensive whistleblower
legislation, "a significant cross section of the American workforce"
is covered by various whistleblower laws, but their protections
are "riddled with loopholes."55 The failure to enact comprehensive
reform has been cited by some as the "single most remarkable de-
ficiency in the protection of legitimate whistleblower activity."56
One possible reason for the lack of comprehensive protection is
that whistleblower protections have often been included in
broader, industry-specific legislation. For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act broadly regulates corporate governance and account-
ing, while the whistleblower protections provide only a part of the
broader scheme.57
Congress has continued to use this piecemeal approach when
dealing with whistleblower laws. For example, in 2007, it ex-
tended whistleblower protection to public transportation,5" rail-
road,59 and commercial motor carrier employees 60 as part of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007. Numerous other bills have been introduced recently, which
similarly grant protections only to employees in specific fields
that receive national attention, such as food, drug, and consumer
safety.6' Because proposed legislation is often a reaction to a na-
tional crisis, it tends to focus on the specific area in which there
was an emergency. For example, the proposed Consumer Product
Safety Commission Reform Act of 2007 would have granted whis-
tleblower protection to employees of manufacturers and retailers
in an attempt to "provide greater protection for children's prod-
ucts" and "improve the effectiveness of consumer product recall
programs " 62 just after many toys were recalled due to lead con-
55. Id. at 79.
56. Id.
57. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
58. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, § 1413, 121 Stat. 266, 414 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1142).
59. Id. § 1521, 121 Stat. at 444 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20109).
60. Id. § 1536, 121 Stat. at 464 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31105).
61. See, e.g., Consumer Food Safety Act of 2007, H.R. 3624, 110th Cong. § 419; Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission Reform Act of 2007, S. 2045, 110th Cong. § 22; Swift
Approval, Full Evaluation Drug Act, H.R. 1165, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007); Safe Food Act of
2007, S. 654, 110th Cong. § 407.
62. Consumer Product Safety Commission Reform Act of 2007, S. 2045. The whistle-
1346 (Vol. 42:1337
BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE
tamination.6 3 As previously discussed, Congress also passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of a large financial crisis.
Given Congress's reluctance to move away from its piecemeal
approach to whistleblower protection, federal legislation only
provides protection from retaliation in specified areas, often on an
industry-specific basis.64 Over thirty different federal laws protect
whistleblowers, including those in the airline,65 banking,66 min-
ing,67 and transportation industries.68 Laws also cover those who
report various environmental,69 health,7° and securities viola-
tions.71 Protection is also granted to government and civil service
employees,72 as well as employees who report contractors that de-
fraud the U.S. government.73
1. The Standard Scheme
Despite different statutes for each industry or class of employ-
ees, almost all whistleblower laws follow the same standard
scheme.74 This is because almost all new whistleblower laws are
modeled after then-existing laws, so they are often drafted in the
same way. Further, because the same agencies enforce many
different whistleblower statutes, the regulations and procedures
blower protection language was later deleted.
63. See Anne D'Innocenzio & Natasha T. Metzler, Lead Paint Leads to Fisher-Price
Toy Recall, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2007, at D3; Kelly Marshall & Rob Kelley, Mattel An-
nounces Third Toy Recall, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.money.cnn.com/
2007/09/05/news/companies/mattel-recall/index.htm.
64. This comment will only address federal legislation because state laws often only
cover wrongful discharge as a tort. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 378. Since this comment
focuses on non-workplace-related retaliation, it will not address these various state protec-
tions, except to discuss their inadequacy in protecting against non-workplace-related re-
taliation. See infra Part VI.C.2.
65. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 1790b (2000) (federal credit union employees); 12 U.S.C. § 1831j
(2000) (FDIC-insured bank employees).
67. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2000).
68. See 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a) (2000).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000) (toxic substances); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (water pol-
lution); 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000) (nuclear energy); 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000) (solid waste); 42
U.S.C. § 7622 (2000) (air pollution); 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2000) (hazardous substances).
70. See 20 U.S.C. § 4018 (2000) (school workers revealing asbestos problems).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. V 2005).
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9) (2000).
73. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
74. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 79-80.
75. See id. at 80.
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are often the same for many different laws. Most notably, the De-
partment of Labor is charged with enforcing sixteen different fed-
eral whistleblower laws, many of which share the same regula-
tions.7 6 Because whistleblower laws are often explicitly crafted
after one another, they generally follow one of two models.
A typical whistleblower protection statute following the first
model states that "[n]o employer may discharge any employee or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment be-
cause the employee" engaged in a protected whistleblowing activ-
ity.77 Many whistleblower laws track this model and specifically
require in the statutory language that the retaliation affect the
terms or conditions of employment. 7
Statutes following the second model do not specify that the re-
taliation must affect the whistleblower's employment. A typical
statute following this model states that "[n]o person shall fire or
in any other way discriminate against" a whistleblower engaging
in protected activity.79 The statutes following this model, how-
ever, have implementing regulations that supply the requirement
that the retaliation must affect the whistleblower's terms or con-
ditions of employment.8 0 Accordingly, whether provided by stat-
ute or regulation, all whistleblower retaliation complainants
must show that the retaliation somehow affected the terms or
conditions of their employment.
Working with this basic statutory framework, courts-
primarily ALJs 5 -have settled on the elements of proving a
prima facie case of retaliation under various whistleblower laws.
76. For a complete list of the sixteen statutes and their implementing regulations, see
U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, The Whistle-
Blower Protection Program, http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2008).
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1) (2000).
78. See, e.g., supra notes 65-66, 68-70.
79. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (2000).
80. See, e.g., Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Federal
Employee Protection Statutes, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,963 (Aug. 10, 2007) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 24).
81. Because the Department of Labor is responsible for hearing initial complaints un-
der numerous whistleblower laws, much of the available precedent comes from the De-
partment of Labor's Administrative Law Judges, who hear disputes under the whistle-
blower statutes the department enforces. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.100-1980.115 (2007).
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The elements are based primarily on Title VII's retaliation provi-
sion. 2 A complainant typically must show that:
(i) The employee engaged in a protected activity;
(ii) The respondent knew or suspected, actually or constructively,
that the employee engaged in the protected activity;
(iii) The employee suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and
(iv) The circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the
protected activity was a motivating factor in the unfavorable ac-
tion.
8 3
These elements apply to all federal whistleblower statutes, re-
gardless of which model of statutory construction they follow. 4
2. The Adverse Employment Action Requirement
Whistleblower statutes generally prohibit discrimination
against employees with respect to their compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.8 " A complainant can
show discrimination in one of two ways.
First, complainants can claim that, because of their protected
activity, their current employer took an adverse employment ac-
tion against them at their current job. 6 This is a common claim
whistleblowers make when alleging retaliation, and many em-
ployer actions are considered adverse employment or personnel
actions, such as firing, transferring, demoting, reassigning, sus-
pending, or refusing to rehire the whistleblower8 7 Denying pro-
82. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for em-
ployment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against
any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter."), with 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) ("No person shall fire,
or in any other way discriminate against, or cause to be fired or discriminated against, any
employee or any authorized representative of employees by reason of the fact that such
employee or representative has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any pro-
ceeding under this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding result-
ing from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.").
83. Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,964.
84. See id. at 44,693 (defining the scope of the regulation).
85. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (2000).
86. See Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints, 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,
964.
87. See STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAw 97-100 (2004).
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motions, moving offices, revoking parking privileges, giving nega-
tive performance evaluations, and denying overtime opportunities
to whistleblowers have also been held to be actionable adverse
employment actions.88 Because employers can retaliate in many
ways, an adverse employment action is commonly defined as an
act that is "reasonably likely to deter employees from making pro-
tected disclosures. '"9 Satisfying this standard, however, generally
requires complainants to show that the adverse action "directly
affect[ed]" their employment. 90 Because of this requirement, re-
taliation not directly affecting the whistleblower's current em-
ployment is often not actionable under this claim.
To fill this void, a second method of showing workplace-related
retaliation is accepted. If the retaliatory act does not directly af-
fect the whistleblower's current employment, he or she can argue
that the offending employer caused specific harm to their future
employment possibilities.91 This second method is arguably more
difficult to prove in court. To prove an effect on future employ-
ment, complainants generally must prove specific acts of "black-
listing [or] interfering with a complainant's subsequent employ-
ment."92 Blacklisting is "marking an employee for avoidance in
employment because she engaged in protected activity."93 This is
often difficult to prove, though, because courts require that the
whistleblower prove "an objective action-there must be evidence
that a specific act of blacklisting occurred."94 The complainant's
subjective feelings or lack of subsequent work opportunities can-
88. Id. at 98-99.
89. Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-0007, at 15-16 (A.L.J. Mar. 4, 2004),
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=212431 (follow ".pdf"
hyperlink).
90. See, e.g., Vodicka v. Dobi Med. Int'l, Inc., 23 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cases (BNA)
1698, 1706 (Dep't of Labor 2005).
91. See KOHN, supra note 87, at 98.
92. Pittman v. Siemens AG, Case No. 2007-SOX-0015, at 4 (A.L.J. July 26, 2007)
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASEDETAILS.CFM?CaseId=232183 (follow ".pdf"
hyperlink) (citing Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., Case No. 2004-SOX-20, at 4 (A.L.J. May 28,
2004), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHI/CASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=217736 (follow
".pdf" hyperlink)).
93. Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat'l Guard, Case Nos. 94-TSC-3, 94-TSC-4, 1995 WL 848112,
at *8 (Dep't of Labor Dec. 11, 1995).
94. Pickett v. Tenn. Valley Auth., Case No. 01-CAA-18, at 9 (Admin. Rev. Bd. Nov. 28,
2003), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASEDETAILS.CFM?CaseId=205526 (follow
.pdf hyperlink under "Final Decision & Order") (citing Howard v. Tenn. Valley Auth., Case
No. 90-ERA-24, at 3-4 (Dep't of Labor July 3, 1991), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEA
RCH/CASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=129914 (follow ".pdf" hyperlink under "Final Decision
& Order of Dismissal")).
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not alone prove blacklisting.9" Due to these onerous require-
ments, blacklisting and negative effects on future employment
are often difficult to prove in a whistleblowing context.
Because of the employment-related requirements in both
methods of proving retaliation, claims often fail if the whistle-
blower does not show that the retaliatory act "directly affected
any aspect of his employment."96 This result seems to follow natu-
rally given the language of the statutes and their implementing
regulations. It would indeed be a strained interpretation of these
laws to hold that retaliation not affecting any aspect of the whis-
tleblower's employment would be actionable. As a result, these
standards leave whistleblowers unprotected against out-of-work
retaliation that does not affect current or future employment.97
IV. BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII RETALIATION AND ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW
Whistleblower retaliation protections are largely modeled after
Title VII's retaliation provision.9" Because the procedures in
whistleblower litigation also track Title VII retaliation litigation
very closely, it is useful to explore the origins of current whistle-
blower laws. Further, because this comment will argue for whis-
tleblower laws' retaliation provisions to conform to Title VII and
the holding in Burlington Northern, an understanding of Title
VII's retaliation provision and its elements are helpful before dis-
cussing Burlington Northern itself.
95. See Pickett, Case No. 01-CAA-18, at 9.
96. Vodicka, 23 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cases (BNA) at 1705. For other whistleblower
cases in which the complainant's retaliation claims failed due to out-of-work retaliation,
see Hirst v. Se. Airlines, Inc., 25 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cases (BNA) 1276 (Dep't of Labor
Jan. 31, 2007); Pittman, Case No. 2007-SOX-0015; Friday v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., Case Nos.
2003-AIR-19, 2003-AIR-20 (Admin. Rev. Bd. July 29, 2005), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMS
SEARCHI/CASEDETAILS.CFM?CaseId= 212562 (follow ".pdf' hyperlink under "Filing by
Court: ARB Final Decision and Order"); Somerson v. Mail Contractors of Am., Case No.
03-STA-11 (Admin. Rev. Bd. Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASE
DETAILS.CFM?Caseld=211330 (follow ".pdf" hyperlink under "Final Order Striking the
Complainant's Brief & Dismissing the Complaint"); Gillilan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., Case
Nos. 91-ERA-31, 91-ERA-34 (Dep't of Labor Aug. 28, 1995), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMS
SEARCH/CASEDETAILS.CFM?Case Id 137795 (follow ".pdf" hyperlink under "Decision &
Remand Order"); Hanna v. Sch. Dist. of Allentown, Case No. 79-TSC-1, 1980 WL 129158
(Dep't of Labor July 28, 1980).
97. See infra Part VI.B for a discussion of types of out-of-work retaliation that are left
uncovered.
98. See supra note 82.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649' was passed as a part
of the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s. Title VII
sought to "assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate ... discriminatory practices" in the workplace. 10' It con-
tained not only broad substantive restrictions on employment dis-
crimination, but also provided a provision to protect workers who
opposed the acts of employment discrimination that Title VII out-
lawed. This retaliation provision states that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees" for engaging in protected activity,
such as making a claim of illegal discrimination or participating
in an investigation.10 ' Notably, unlike whistleblower retaliation
laws, this language does not expressly restrict the adverse action
to the terms or conditions of the plaintiff-employee's employment.
Despite the statutory language, most courts still required pre-
Burlington Northern Title VII plaintiffs to show: "(1) participation
in a protected activity; (2) knowledge by the employer of the em-
ployee's protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and
(4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the ad-
verse employment action."'12
Before Burlington Northern, different circuit courts maintained
different standards for how closely related the adverse action
must be to the plaintiffs employment. Some circuits required a
strong connection, viewing only ultimate employment decisions as
adverse employment actions. 103 Other circuits used a standard
that required a "materially adverse change in the terms and con-
ditions of employment.""0 4 Still others did not require a connec-
99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2000).
100. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
102. Spadola v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
103. See Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that hostility by supervisors and improper handling of disability benefits in retaliation did
not rise to the standard of an "ultimate employment decision" and therefore was not ac-
tionable); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Title VII only protects against major adverse decisions such as hiring, firing, and compen-
sation).
104. Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999); see also White v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-802 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (considering and
rejecting broader interpretation of Title VII and reaffirming its line of cases requiring a
significant change in employment status); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866
(4th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming line of cases requiring an adverse effect on the plaintiffs
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring plaintiff to show that the adverse effect was enough to
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tion between the adverse action and the plaintiffs employment, 10'5
often abrogating or explaining away their earlier decisions in
which they "described the prima facie case for retaliation as re-
quiring an adverse 'personnel' or adverse 'employment' action." °6
This circuit split eventually led the Supreme Court to take up the
issue of whether Title VII's retaliation provision "confine[d] ac-
tionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and condi-
tions of employment" in Burlington Northern."7
V. BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE
RAILWAY COMPANY V. WHITE
The circuit split discussed in Part IV, along with the need for a
clear standard on how harmful adverse actions must be before
they are actionable, necessitated a uniform rule from the Su-
preme Court. The Burlington Northern case provided that oppor-
tunity. The case began in 1997 and wound its way through the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee, a Sixth Circuit panel, and,
eventually, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc.0'0 The Sixth Circuit
as a whole, however, could not agree on the proper standards to
be applied in Title VII retaliation claims.0 9 Thus, the Supreme
Court agreed to resolve the dispute.
Burlington Northern is perhaps best known for outlining a uni-
form standard for how severe a retaliatory act must be before it is
actionable. 10 More important for this comment, though, is the
Court's holding that non-workplace-related retaliation is also ac-
alter his terms or conditions of employment).
105. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-19 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (adopting rule
that Title VII retaliation does not have to be employment-related to be actionable, despite
dicta in prior cases indicating that retaliation must be employment-related); Washington
v. Ill. Dep't Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2005) (adopting a standard that does
not require retaliation to be employment-related); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-
43 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that retaliation need not be related to the plaintiff-employee's
employment.).
106. See Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1217.
107. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2408 (2006).
108. See id. at 2409-10.
109. Id. at 2410.
110. Burlington Northern held that "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse." Id. at 2415; see also John
Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 539, 545-51 (2007) (further discussing this new standard and its likely impacts).
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tionable in Title VII retaliation claims.111 The Court's discussion
of this holding can be broken down into two distinguishable sup-
porting arguments. First, the statutory language does not require
the adverse action to be employment-related.' 2 Second, the pur-
pose behind anti-retaliation laws would not be fulfilled if the pro-
visions did not protect against out-of-work retaliation. 113
The Court first noted that Title VII limited the scope of its sub-
stantive restrictions to workplace-related discrimination.'14 It
then recognized that "[n]o such limiting words appear in the anti-
retaliation provision.""' 5 The lack of limiting words required the
Court to determine whether Congress intended to differentiate
the scope of the two provisions." 6 To accomplish this, the Court
needed to identify the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision.
1 7
It stated that the "anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent
harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct," in
speaking out against discrimination."' The Court then held that
"one cannot secure [that] objective by focusing only upon em-
ployer actions and harm that concern employment and the work-
place."" 9 Further, "[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against
an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employ-
ment or by causing him harm outside the workplace." 2 ° Because
of this, the Court determined that even if all employment-related
retaliation was eliminated, "the anti-retaliation provision's objec-
tive would not be achieved."' 2 ' Thus, the anti-retaliation provi-
sion's scope could not be limited to only workplace-related retalia-
tion because that "would not deter the many forms that effective
111. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 2412-13. For a more thorough discussion of this breakdown and the
Court's holding and analysis, see Michael A. Metcalfe, Recent Decision, Title VIi's Anti-
Retaliation Provision Prohibits Any Employer Conduct that Might Dissuade a Reasonable
Worker from Making or Supporting a Charge of Discrimination: Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 761, 764-65 (2007).
114. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12.





120. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 12, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259). For examples of types of non-workplace-related
retaliation, see supra Part VI.B.
121. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
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retaliation can take."122 The Court lastly recognized a larger pol-
icy objective secured by protecting against out-of-work retaliation:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of em-
ployees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.
"Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if em-
ployees felt free to approach officials with their grievances." Inter-
preting the anti-retaliation provision to provide broad protection
from retaliation helps assure the cooperation u3on which accom-
plishment of the Act's primary objective depends.
In closing, the Court succinctly held that "[t]he scope of the
anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or
employment-related retaliatory acts and harm."'24
VI. A CALL FOR REFORM-AMENDING WHISTLEBLOWER
LAWS AND APPLYING BURLINGTON NORTHERN To
EXTEND THEIR SCOPE
The Burlington Northern decision created a fundamental in-
consistency between whistleblower retaliation laws and non-
whistleblower retaliation laws. The former requires an adverse
employment or personnel action; the latter now does not. 125 While
this inconsistency could be resolved through evolving judicial in-
terpretation in whistleblower cases, as Burlington Northern did
for Title VII cases, the fact that most whistleblower retaliation
laws specifically require an adverse employment action does not
allow for judicial modification of this element. Many federal
courts extending Title VII claims to encompass out-of-work re-
taliation chose to follow the language of the statute instead of the
judicially created cause of action, which required an adverse em-
ployment action.'26 This is not possible with whistleblower laws
because the statutes and regulations themselves provide that the
adverse action must be employment-related.127 In order to har-
monize retaliation claims across all fields and to provide proper
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2414 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292
(1960)).
124. Id.
125. See Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
126. See, e.g., EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 756, 757-60 (N.D.
Ohio 1999).
127. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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encouragement and protection for whistleblowers, existing whis-
tleblower statutes' retaliation provisions should be modified to
eliminate the requirement that the adverse action be employ-
ment-related.
Several justifications support this measure. First, and most
important, are the significant public policy objectives that are
served by encouraging whistleblowers to expose harmful wrong-
doing. 12 In order to encourage and protect whistleblowers fully,
the statutes and regulations must protect whistleblowers against
out-of-work retaliation. The policy objectives discussed in Bur-
lington Northern fully support this shift in whistleblower law. 1
29
Second, this step is necessary because current laws still leave ef-
fective methods of retaliation uncovered. 3 ° Finally, extending
protection to out-of-work retaliation is necessary because other
laws that could be applied to out-of-work retaliatory acts are
largely ineffective in this context and fall short of the protections
that whistleblower provisions grant.13' Each of these justifica-
tions will be discussed in turn.
A. Policy Objectives and the Purpose of Retaliation Laws
Laws protect whistleblowers from retaliation because whistle-
blowers expose illegal and harmful acts that injure the public.
Because the illegal acts are generally conducted secretly, internal
whistleblowers are crucial in exposing them. Employees and
other internal actors are often the only people who know about
the illegal activity occurring. Thus, they are in the best, and often
only, position to reveal the illegal behavior. They are frequently
"the only firsthand witnesses to the [activity]. They are the only
people who can testify as to 'who knew what, and when ....
Like Title VII, the many laws that grant whistleblowers protec-
tion "depend[ ] for [their] enforcement upon the cooperation of
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as wit-
nesses."
133
128. See infra Part VI.A.
129. See Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-13.
130. See infra Part VI.B.
131. See infra Part VI.C.
132. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10 (2002).
133. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
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Encouraging whistleblowers to cooperate and expose wrongdo-
ing depends heavily on potential whistleblowers knowing that
they will be protected if they make disclosures or participate in
investigations.134 To effectively accomplish this, would-be whis-
tleblowers need to be protected against all forms of retaliation,
not just those that occur at work. As the Supreme Court noted in
Burlington Northern, "a provision limited to employment-related
actions would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation
can take."135 As relayed in the Senate Report of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, "most corporate employers, with help from their law-
yers, know exactly what they can do to a whistleblowing em-
ployee under the law."13 Further, the Report proclaims that "U.S.
laws need to encourage and protect those who report" illegal ac-
tivity. 13
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern provides
especially strong support for modifying whistleblower laws to pro-
tect potential whistleblowers more effectively. Much of the opin-
ion's logic can be directly applied to whistleblower law. One per-
tinent portion explains that "one cannot secure the [objective of
anti-retaliation laws] by focusing only upon employer actions and
harm that concern employment and the workplace. Were all such
actions and harms eliminated, the anti-retaliation provision's ob-
jective would not be achieved." 13' The objective spoken of "is to
ensure that employees are 'completely free from coercion against
reporting' unlawful practices." 139 This objective, although dis-
cussed in the context of Title VII, applies equally-if not more
forcefully-to whistleblower laws. These laws exist to ensure that
potential whistleblowers will feel free to reveal wrongdoing. 4 ' It
is anomalous to grant protection against non-workplace-related
retaliation to those who speak out against employment discrimi-
nation, but not extend this protection to those who reveal fraud
that costs investors and the public billions of dollars or those who
expose dangerous national security flaws.
134. See S. REP. No. 107-146, at 10.
135. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
136. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 19.
137. Id.
138. Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
139. Id. at 2414 (quoting NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972)).
140. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-13; see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19.
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B. Effective Types of Retaliation Are Left Uncovered
Many effective types of non-workplace-related retaliation are
left uncovered by current whistleblower laws. A recent decision
highlights the limitations of whistleblower retaliation provisions.
In Pittman v. Siemens AG, the ALJ concluded that a retaliation
claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower provision did
not extend to an alleged harassing lawsuit and allegation of slan-
der.141 The ALJ held that because the complainant "was not an
employee at the time of the alleged adverse act and this does not
constitute blacklisting or interference with employment, [his
claims were] not covered by the Act." '42 The ALJ cited Harvey v.
Home Depot, Inc.,'43 another Sarbanes-Oxley case, in support of
his ruling.' Harvey later reached the Administrative Review
Board of the Department of Labor ("DOL"), which affirmed the
ALJ's decision to dismiss the complainant's retaliation complaint:
[Blecause Harvey was not an employee of Home Depot at the time
that he was allegedly harassed, the alleged harassment was not an
adverse personnel action that affected the terms and conditions of
his employment with Home Depot .... [Further,] Harvey did not
present any evidence of blacklisting resulting from the alleged har-
assment; thus there was no support for a conclusion that the alleged
harassment had adversely affected the terms or conditions of any of
Harvey's subsequent employment. Consequently ... Harvey did not
allege facts to show that he met the adverse employment action ele-
ment of a [Sarbanes-Oxley] complaint and, therefore . . . Harvey's
second complaint [was properly dismissed] for failing to state a cause
of action upon which relief may be granted under [Sarbanes-
Oxley]. 14 5
One need not look far to find other similar examples. Com-
plaints of harassing lawsuits as a basis for retaliation have been
dismissed in several other whistleblower cases.146 In one case
141. Case No. 2007-SOX-0015, at 6 (A.L.J. July 26, 2007), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMS
SEARCHI/CASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=232183 (follow ".pdf' hyperlink).
142. Id. at 6-7.
143. Case No. 2004-SOX-20 (A.L.J. May 28, 2004) http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMS
SEARCHICASEDETAILS.CFM?CaseId=217736 (follow ".pdf" hyperlink).
144. See Pittman, Case No. 2007-SOX-0015, at 6.
145. Harvey, Case No. 2004-SOX-20, at 21.
146. See, e.g., Vodicka v. Dobi Med. Int'l, 23 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cases (BNA) 1698
(Dep't of Labor Dec. 23, 2005); Somerson v. Mail Contractors of Am., Case No. 03-STA-11
(Admin. Rev. Bd. Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASEDETAILS.
CFM?Caseld=211330 (follow ".pdf' hyperlink under "Final Order Striking the Complain-
ant's Brief & Dismissing the Complaint"); Hanna v. Sch. Dist. of Allentown, Case No. 79-
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arising under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Re-
form Act for the 21st Century, the DOL's Administrative Review
Board determined that threats to turn in a complainant for unau-
thorized practice of law and banning the complainant from the
employer's property had nothing to do with the complainant's
terms or conditions of employment while he was on medical re-
tirement. 1
47
Cases in other contexts provide numerous examples of out-of-
work retaliation that would likely not be covered under existing
whistleblower laws. Several Title VII cases have involved harass-
ing or retaliatory lawsuits that had no effect on the plaintiff's
present or future employment. 148 These claims often succeeded
with the courts invoking reasoning similar to that in Burlington
Northern. One of these cases, in a lengthy exposition strikingly
similar to the Supreme Court's later decision in Burlington
Northern, declined to limit actionable retaliation to employment-
related actions and held that "nothing in the plain language of
the statute admits of such a qualification."'149
Other plaintiffs have successfully claimed retaliation apart
from the employment context. In one instance, cancelling a major
symposium after a former employee filed a suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act constituted actionable retalia-
tion. 5 o Another court found that an employer's frivolous appeal of
a former employee's worker's compensation award can be retalia-
tory. 5' Other claims, ranging from filing false criminal charges 52
to not properly investigating death threats made to an FBI
TSC-1, 1980 WL 129158 (Dep't of Labor July 28, 1980).
147. Friday v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., Case Nos. 03-AIR-19, 03-AIR-20 (Admin. Rev. Bd.
July 29, 2005), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCHICASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=212
562 (follow ".pdf' hyperlink under "Filing by Court: ARB Final Decision and Order").
148. See, e.g., Gliatta v. Tectum, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (bad-faith
counterclaim); EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(bad-faith counterclaim); EEOC v. Va. Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D.
Va. 1980) (bad-faith lawsuit).
149. Outback Steakhouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
150. See Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
151. See Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230-32 (D.N.M. 2001).
152. See Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (filing criminal
charges of theft and forgery); Beckham v. Grand Affair of N.C., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 415, 417,
419 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (causing a former employee to be arrested for criminal trespass on
employer's property).
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agent, 1 3 have been ruled actionable even though they did not af-
fect the plaintiffs' terms or conditions of employment.
The primary reason for these non-workplace-related retaliation
claims succeeding in other contexts is the statutory language of
other retaliation laws, such as Title VII. The analysis in these
cases would not carry over to whistleblower retaliation cases,
however, because whistleblower laws specifically require an effect
on the complainant's terms or conditions of employment. 154 This
lingering requirement has the potential to preclude many legiti-
mate whistleblower retaliation suits from being successful, de-
spite the fact that the same retaliatory acts would be actionable
under Title VII and other anti-retaliation laws. Again, this result
is anomalous because both whistleblower and non-whistleblower
retaliation laws seek to prevent the same harm.
C. Other Current Laws Are Inadequate To Protect Against
Uncovered Out-of-Work Retaliation
Other laws could potentially cover retaliatory acts that whis-
tleblower laws leave uncovered, but they are inadequate to pre-
vent all types of retaliation. Witness and informant tampering
crimes cover retaliation against whistleblowers,' 5 but these
claims are rarely effective.'56 Further, many states recognize a
wrongful discharge tort that covers whistleblowers; this action,
however, generally protects only against termination in violation
of public policy.'57 This leaves no recourse for out-of-work retalia-
tion. Finally, other unrelated laws that could cover retaliatory
conduct do not provide proper relief and are inefficient.
1. Criminal Penalties
Federal witness tampering law makes it a crime to "knowingly,
with the intent to retaliate, take[ I] any action harmful to any per-
son, including interference with the lawful employment or liveli-
hood of any person" because the person provided federal law en-
153. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213-14, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
154. See Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2000).
156. Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757,
1763-65 (2007).
157. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 21.
1360 [Vol. 42:1337
BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE
forcement officers with truthful information regarding federal
crimes.15 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act broadened this provision's
scope to its current form as part of its whistleblower protection
scheme.15 9 However, federal prosecutors will likely only use this
measure in cases of gross misconduct by employers that is in
some way uniquely egregious or particularly noteworthy. In other
words, it will not be used as a response to run-of-the-mill whistle-
blower retaliation claims. Since broadening this provision in
2002, no one has been specifically charged under it for retaliating
against a whistleblower. Further, because the criminal provision
only covers information given to federal law enforcement officers,
retaliation against internal whistleblowers is not a crime under
this section160 and neither is exposing conduct that does not vio-
late a federal law.161 The small likelihood of federal prosecutors
using this provision probably will not provide much comfort to po-
tential whistleblowers, nor will it by itself deter employers from
retaliating against whistleblowers.
2. State Tort Actions for Wrongful Discharge
Many states recognize a tort action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. 16 2 These laws may cover many whistle-
blowers. However, these tort actions generally only extend to em-
ployees who were fired as a result of their whistleblowing. 6 3 The
laws are often narrowly tailored as well. Under Virginia law, for
example, "an employee plaintiff attempting to assert a wrongful
discharge claim in violation of public policy must 'identify [a] Vir-
ginia statute establishing a public policy"' that the employer vio-
lated.6 ' Most other states similarly limit this tort action to cases
in which the employer fired the employee for reporting crimes, re-
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. V 2007).
159. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1107, 116 Stat. 745, 810
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. V 2007)).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. V 2007).
161. See id.
162. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 21.
163. See id.
164. McFarland v. Va. Ret. Servs. of Chesterfield, L.L.C., 477 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733
(E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806,
809 (Va. 1996)).
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fusing to participate in illegal activities, or exercising a legally
protected right. 165
While this tort provides some added protection to whistleblow-
ers at the state level, it generally does not protect against non-
workplace-related retaliation. In fact, it often does not cover other
retaliation short of termination. 166 These state tort actions are,
therefore, largely unhelpful when a whistleblower is subjected to
out-of-work retaliation.
3. Other Unrelated Laws
Various other laws may also protect whistleblowers against re-
taliatory acts, including causes of action such as malicious prose-
cution or intentional infliction of emotional distress. These laws
do not effectively combat out-of-work retaliation against whistle-
blowers either.
In many cases discussed above in Part VI.B, employers filed
harassing lawsuits or counterclaims against a whistleblower in
retaliation.'67 In some cases, the whistleblowers may have been
able to recover under a tort action of malicious prosecution. This
action generally requires: (1) the malicious prosecution defendant
to initiate a lawsuit against the malicious prosecution plaintiff,
which ends in the malicious prosecution plaintiffs favor; (2) a
lack of probable cause; and (3) malice. 68 A substantial minority of
jurisdictions, however, requires a malicious prosecution plaintiff
to prove special injuries as a fourth and separate element.'69
Many jurisdictions require extraordinary injuries. For example,
the District of Columbia, injuries to reputation, emotional dis-
tress, loss of income, and 'substantial expense in defending' have
all been held to fall outside the scope of the definition of special
injury." "' These injuries are often of the type that employers seekto inflict when they file harassing lawsuits retaliating against
165. See KOHN, supra note 1, at 23. An exhaustive survey, including citations, of what
each state protects follows the general discussion. See id. at 25-77.
166. See id. at 24.
167. See, e.g., supra notes 141-49.
168. See Megan K. Dorritie, Annotation, Cause of Action for the Malicious Prosecution
of Civil Actions, 32 C.O.A.2d 131, 146 (2006).
169. See id. at 158-59.
170. Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 793 A.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Ma-
zanderan v. McGranery, 490 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. 1984)).
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whistleblowers. These torts, because they are state actions, also
vary in each jurisdiction. Therefore, the malicious prosecution
tort cannot effectively accomplish the goals of uniformity in pro-
tecting whistleblowers and protection against all types of retalia-
tion. Further, even if this tort was uniformly effective throughout
the country, it would only prevent retaliation in the form of filing
harassing lawsuits. Many avenues of retaliation would still be left
open.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims suf-
fer similar deficiencies. An IIED claim generally requires the
plaintiff to show extreme or outrageous conduct accompanied by
severe emotional distress.171 The first hurdle would require a
whistleblower to show that the employer's retaliatory act was ex-
treme or outrageous. This is a difficult standard to prove and is
much higher than the normal standard for finding an adverse ac-
tion in a whistleblower context. 172 A typical IIED cause of action
requires the act to be "'so outrageous in character and so extreme
in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized soci-
ety."' 173 In the whistleblower context, the action is often judged by
whether it would be "reasonably likely to deter employees from
making protected disclosures."'74 There is a large gap between
behavior that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a
disclosure and behavior that is extreme or outrageous, as defined
above. The entire range of behavior comprising that void is left
uncovered by relying on IIED claims for out-of-work retaliation.
Second, an IIED plaintiff must suffer severe emotional dis-
tress.175 This is also a high standard to prove. Recovery is often
limited to cases in which the plaintiffs emotional distress makes
him or her incapable of performing daily activities or the plain-
tiffs condition is severely disabling emotionally. 176 Often, physical
171. See generally 86 C.J.S. Torts § 70 (2006) (discussing general background and cause
of action of IIED tort action).
172. See id.
173. Soti v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 906 So. 2d 916, 919 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Griner, 809 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 2001)).
174. Halloum v. Intel Corp., Case No. 2003-SOX-00007, at 16 (A.L.J. Mar. 4, 2004),
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/DMSSEARCH/CASEDETAILS.CFM?Caseld=212431 (follow ".pdf'
hyperlink).
175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
176. See 43 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress §
10 (1985).
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effects stemming from the emotional distress are crucial in prov-
ing the plaintiffs case. 177 Like the void discussed above, there is
again a large range of uncovered retaliatory behavior that may
dissuade a reasonable worker from making a disclosure, but
would not result in such severe emotional distress as to be ac-
tionable IIED.'7 s
If non-workplace-related retaliation was covered under whis-
tleblower laws-as this comment suggests-these inefficiencies
and shortcomings would be irrelevant because whistleblowers
would not need to rely on state tort actions and federal criminal
penalties. Whistleblowers would not have to resort to unrelated
laws that were designed for other injuries in order to remedy out-
of-work retaliation. They would also not be constrained by narrow
or varying state causes of action that change depending on where
the whistleblower brings suit. Providing whistleblowers statutory
protection against non-workplace-related retaliation would pro-
vide them with a consolidated cause of action and a simple and
easily implemented solution to all of the deficiencies noted above.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whistleblowers are vital to our country's continued well-being.
They root out corruption, fraud, waste, and illegal or dangerous
activities. They are brave enough to withstand the inevitable re-
taliation and criticism that they will face, yet existing laws do not
adequately protect whistleblowers. Because current legislation
only covers workplace-related retaliation, whistleblowers can still
be subjected to non-workplace-related retaliation as a result of
the disclosures they make. Due to a recent shift in Title VII law,
however, plaintiffs alleging retaliation in non-whistleblower con-
177. See id.
178. Further, even assuming that both of these unrelated tort claims were viable, al-
lowing a whistleblower to consolidate all of his retaliation claims into a single retaliation
suit would be more efficient overall. Whistleblowers often must file their claims first with
governmental agencies, such as the Department of Labor or the Office of Special Counsel.
Malicious prosecution or IIED claims cannot be filed with those agencies. If non-
workplace-related retaliation claims were allowed, a whistleblower could file one retalia-
tion suit with the proper agency, instead of relying on the agency for employment-related
claims, a state court for the out-of-work tort claims, and federal prosecutors for any re-
taliation left over. Further, the agencies and ALJs could continue to follow Title VII prece-
dent with respect to out-of-work retaliation as they have been doing in other respects for
years. Allowing all retaliation claims to be consolidated would reduce the time, money,
and judicial resources involved in the process.
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texts are now protected against all types of retaliation, whether
employment-related or not. Despite this inconsistency, current
whistleblower laws cannot be legitimately interpreted to cover
non-workplace-related retaliation, which Title VII covers. Be-
cause this distinction in statutory language now produces un-
equal results, current and future whistleblower laws need to be
amended to protect whistleblowers against the various forms of
non-workplace-related retaliation that they may endure. Accord-
ingly, the employment-related requirement for retaliation in
whistleblower statutes should be eliminated and Title VII's statu-
tory language and judicial interpretation, which together forbid
out-of-work retaliation in addition to workplace-related retalia-
tion, should be adopted in all whistleblower laws.
Robert Johnson

